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AUCTIONEERS' LIABILITY FOR CONVERSION UNDER
THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ACT*
AN agent who, in the ordinary course of business, sells goods his principal
obtained through fraud or theft is liable in conversion to the rightful owner.
Good faith and ignorance of the true owner's title do not relieve the agent of
liability.' Nor can he raise the defense of merely acting on his principal's be-
half; he is considered a joint tort-feasor in the conversion.2 Occasionally,
courts and legislatures have abrogated this common-law rule for agents who
can be deemed conduits or public utilities.3 Yet regulatory legislation alone
*United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957), reversing 139 F. Supp. 683
(N.D. Cal. 1956).
1. Kearney v. Clutton, 101 Mich. 106, 59 N.W. 419 (1894) ; Spraights v. Hawley, 39
N.Y. 441 (1868) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Siman, 65 S.D. 514, 275 N.W. 347 (1937). 1 HARmR
& JAMES, TORTS § 2.19 (1956); see 14 U. CH. L. REv. 713 (1947); 2 MECHEm, ArEncy
§ 2345 (1914) (auctioneers). Contra, Frizzell v. Rundle & Co., 88 Tenn. 396, 12 S.W. 918
(1890). See also 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 233, comment b (1934), which finds an in-
nocent agent liable for conversion only where his exercise of dominion involves negotiation
of the transaction purporting to transfer a proprietary interest in the chattel as well as
consummation of the transaction by a transfer of possession.
Hoffman v. Carow, 22 Wend. 285, 318 (N.Y. 1839), formulated the rule of strict lia-
bility: "[E]very man [must] look to the character of those with whom he deals, and who
are responsible for the title of property in the articles bought and sold. If he does not do
this, he must take the consequent risk. The same considerations of public policy apply to
him who sells as the agent of another, as to him who buys; both of them are to look to
the character of the person with whom they deal. If in this way they are negligent, or
have been deceived, they must take the consequences whenever their rights come into con-
flict with those of any innocent sufferer by the act of the same guilty third party."
2. Such a defense assumes that the agency relationship may absolve the agent. But
no common-law principle exists which exempts one person from the consequences of his
acts because of the command of another. SEAVWY, STUDIES IN AGENcy 2 (1949) ; Note,
4 U. Pirw. L. Rav. 46 (1937). The principal's fraud is not imputed to the agent. The agent
of a tortious principal is liable because he participates in the commission of the tort. Levy
Bros. v. Karp, 124 Misc. 901, 209 N.Y. Supp. 720 (Sup. Ct. 1924); see Birmingham v.
Rice Bros., 238 Iowa 410, 413, 26 N.W.2d 39, 41, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947) ; 2
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 349 (1933). See also 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 2.19 (1956),
suggesting that, outside the negotiable instruments field, the defense of acting for another
is properly denied only in cases of dispossession, destruction and detention of a chattel at
the direction of the principal, or when the agent himself negotiates a sale or purchase on
behalf of his principal and delivers or receives the goods pursuant thereto; Leuthold v.
Fairchild, 35 Minn. 99, 27 N.W. 503 (1886).
3. The "conduit" exception to the prevailing rule was first set forth in a dissent in
Hoffman v. Carow, 22 Wend. 285, 307 (N.Y. 1839) : "The only ground upon which a party
should be held liable, is that he has the property or its value in his possession, or has with
knowledge or under notice, illegally disposed of it; and not by reason of having been the
mere conduit for its transmission from one to another. . . ." This line of reasoning has been
specifically followed in Nanson v. Jacob, 93 Mo. 331, 339, 6 S.W. 246, 249 (1887) ("a mere
bailee .. .is guilty of no conversion, though he receive property from one not rightfully
entitled to possession, and, acting as a mere conduit, deliver it in pursuance of the bail-
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does not confer immunity.4 Thus, when Congress placed livestock commission
agents under the Packers and Stockyards Act without granting explicit im-
munity, the scope of liability remained undefined.5
ment"); Cresswell v. Leftridge, 194 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946) (citing Nanson v.
Jacob, supra) ; Gruntal v. United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 474,
173 N.E. 682, 634 (1930) (stockbroker "is a mere conduit between the seller and the pur-
chaser"). The public utility exception, invoked in similar situations, is equally well de-
veloped. See Blackwell v. Laird, 236 Mo. App. 1217, 163 S.W.2d 91 (1942) (livestock
commission agent a public utility and not liable) ; Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89 F. Supp. 317
(D. Neb. 1950) (same, alternative ground) ; Shellnut v. Central of Ga. Ry., 131 Ga. 404, 62
S.E. 294 (1908) (same, common carrier). See also Note, 33 T&-XAs L. REv. 534 (1955).
Although couched in different language, the exceptions are not always distinguishable.
See Abernathy v. Wheeler, 92 Ky. 320, 17 S.W. 858 (1891) (warehouseman a public inter-
mediary and hence not liable), which seems to rely on both. A fundamental notion under-
lying the conduit exception stresses the absence of an agent's property interest in goods
over which dominion is asserted. An auctioneer, for instance, may be thought not to claim
chattels as his own since he assumes no possessory rights to them. Green v. Crye, 158
Tenn. 109, 11 S.W.2d 869 (1928). However, the conduit exception is particularly appli-
cable to common carriers, which also enjoy immunity from conversion as public utilities.
And to put factors, commission agents and auctioneers under the rubric of conduit, the
technical objection that such agents assist in passing title, while carriers do not, must be
circumvented. See 32 MINN. L. REV. 86 (1947) (commission agents).
The public utility exception, which derives from the requirement that businesses affected
with a public use serve all without discrimination, can be used in nonconduit cases. A
private business, while liable for unintentional conversion, can exercise choice by refusing
to deal with certain customers. A public utility exchanges this privilege of choice for the
judicial compensation of escaping liability for conversion. See 1. WYM~rANt, PUBLIC SERVICE
CORPOrATIONS §§ 331, 604 (1911). See also Farmers Livestock Comm'n Co. v. United
States, 54 F.2d 375 (E.D. Ill. 1931) (business affected with public use must serve all with-
out discrimination).
For an example of legislatively granted immunity, see MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 52-
319 (Supp. 1957) : "No livestock market to which livestock is shipped shall be held liable
to any mortgagee for the proceeds of livestock sold through such livestock market by the
mortgagor...."
4. Immunity is especially uncertain if prior case law placed liability on the intermediate
agent. Subsequent legislation may denominate the agent a public utility and regulate him
accordingly. Any resulting ambiguity is usually decided in favor of liability, since protec-
tion of the owner's title and right is generally a more favored principle than limited
liability of public utilities. See Citizens State Bank v. Farmers Union Livestock Coopera-
tive Co., 165 Kan. 96, 193 P.2d 636 (1948) ; cf. John Clay & Co. Livestock Comm'n v.
Clements, 214 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1954).
5. 42 STAT. 159 (1921), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1952). Although stockyard
agencies are not designated public utilities in the statute, strict regulation coupled with a
duty to deal with all customers on a nondiscriminatory basis has been interpreted as mak-
ing them such. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922); see 31 MARQ. L. REV.
103-04 (1947).
Some courts have construed the statute not to relieve market agencies, despite their
public utility status, from tort liability for wrongful conversion to avoid abrogating "legal
rights subsisting in the general public under state laws." Birmingham v. Rice Bros., 238
Iowa 410, 418, 26 N.W.2d 39, 43, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 763 (1947) ; see Sig Ellingson v.
De Vries, 199 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 934 (1953) ; Mason City
Production Credit Ass'n v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 205 Minn. 537, 286 N.W. 713, cert. denied,
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Recently, in United States v. Matthews,6 the Ninth Circuit confirmed the
liability of livestock auctioneers doing business under the act.7 In Matthews,
the principal executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the Farmers' Home
Administration, a United States government agency.8 Duly recorded at execu-
tion, the mortgage covered specific livestock, among other farm chattels, and
contained the usual provision for immediate possession upon default.0 Default-
ing shortly after execution, mortgagor periodically removed certain of the live-
stock from the county of recordation to an adjoining county where he fraudu-
lently consigned them to an auctioneer operating under the act.', After obtain-
ing the mortgagor's written warranty of clear title, the auctioneer sold the live-
stock at auction and paid the mortgagor the proceeds less commission.' The
government brought suit in a federal court against the auctioneer almost three
years after default.1  Federal law obtained because the suit was based on gov-
ernment paper.13
308 U.S. 599 (1939), Walker v. Caviness, 256 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) ; FINE,
DIGEST DEcisIoNs UNDER THE PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS Act 29 (1942) (citing Mason
City Production Credit Ass'n v. Sig Ellingson & Co., supra) : "Courts should be slow to
conclude that the Act was designed to supersede local law respecting the force and effect
of chattel mortgage security received at public stockyards."
Other courts, relying on the agent's public utility status under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act, have exonerated commission agents for liability in conversion. United States
v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956); Sullivan v. Wells, 89 F. Supp. 317 (D. Neb.
1950); Blackwell v. Laird, 236 Mo. App. 1217, 163 S.W.2d 91, (1942). The Supreme
Court has neither settled federal law in point nor determined whether the act required a
change in state law to protect interstate commerce.
6. 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957), reversing 139 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
7. By far the majority of recent cases involve livestock commission agents. See, e.g.,
Mason City Production Credit Ass'n v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 205 Minn. 537, 286 N.W.
713, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 599 (1939) (stockyard agents held liable for selling cattle sub-
ject to a chattel mortgage) ; John Clay & Co. Livestock Comm'n v. Clements, 214 F.2d
803 (5th Cir. 1954) (resale of livestock for fraudulent purchaser) ; Citizens State Bank
v. Farmers Union Livestock Cooperative Co., 165 Kan. 96, 193 P.2d 636 (1.948) (sale of
livestock subject to a chattel mortgage) ; cf. Morin v. Hood, 96 N.H. 485, 79 A.2d 4 (1951)
(wrongful sale of fixtures subject to a chattel mortgage).
8. 244 F.2d at 627.
9. Id. at 627-28.
10. United States v. Matthews, 139 F. Supp. 683, 684 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
11. 244 F.2d at 628.
12. Ibid.
13. Had federal jurisdiction arisen on diversity grounds, state law would have pre-
vailed. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Relevant California law imposes lia-
bility on an innocent auctioneer when his principal does not have good title to the chattels
sold. See Swim v. Wilson, 90 Cal. 126, 27 Pac. 33 (1891) (innocent stockbroker liable to
true owner for selling shares stolen by third person) ; Lusitanian-American Development
Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp., 1 Cal. 2d 121, 34 P.2d 139 (1934) (auctioneer liable
in conversion to conditional vendor). Neither the district court nor the circuit court in
Matthews, however, resorted to state law; instead, they relied on Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The Clearfield doctrine prefers federal to state law
if commercial paper issued by the United States is the basis for a suit. See contra, United
States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956) (state law prevails where government
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The court treated the case as a variation on the common-law triangle of
principal-mortgagor, agent-auctioneer, and rightful owner out of possession
-mortgagee. 14 Since the auctioneer stood in the shoes of his principal, it rea-
soned, he could not avoid liability despite his innocence. 15 Nor could he invoke
that provision of the Packers and Stockyards Act compelling stockyard agencies
to furnish upon reasonable request nondiscriminatory services to all sellers,
handlers and purchasers. 16 Presumably, an auctioneer's refusal to serve an
apparent owner without some proof of identity and title would not amount to
unreasonable discrimination.' 7
sues in conversion on chattel mortgage held by FHA). Enabled to rely on federal com-
mon law, the district court followed Drovers' Cattle Loan & Inv. Co. v. Rice, 10 F.2d 510
(N.D. Iowa 1926), a diversity case decided before Erie and hence governed by the rule
of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which did not compel federal courts to
follow state law. The Rice court made no mention of the Packers and Stockyards Act but
held that bona fide commission merchants were not subject to constructive notice of a chat-
tel mortgage on fraudulently obtained livestock.
14. Of the remedies available to the government, indemnification from the auctioneer
is probably the most certain. The auctioneer is usually reachable and solvent, while the
ultimate purchaser has either vanished or looks to a factors' act for protection. Largely
confined to sales through commission merchants in agricultural produce markets, factors'
acts may give an innocent purchaser good title against the true owner. Gilmore, The Coin-
inercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1058 (1954) ; Gilmore, On
the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 1346 (1.948). See also
2 WILLISTON, SALES § 320 (1948), for a collection of state factors' acts. Thus, the gov-
ernment may actually be reduced to choosing between the auctioneer and the fraudulent
mortgagor, a dilemma easily resolved against the auctioneer. An owner whose goods have
been stolen faces similar problems. For a comparison in a negotiable instrument context,
see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1107, 1108-09 (1957).
15. "The factor, even though innocent . . . is liable if he assists in . . . conversion
because he stands in the shoes of his principal." 244 F.2d at 629, citing Birmingham v. Rice
Bros., 238 Iowa 410, 414-15, 26 N.W.2d 39, 42, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947). But
the maxim, "like principal, like agent," is inappropriately applied to the present situation.
See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
16. 42 STAT. 164 (1921), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 205 (1952), provides: "It shall be
the duty of every stockyard owner and market agency to furnish upon reasonable request,
without discrimination, reasonable stockyard services . . . ." Courts have interpreted the
requirements of this section as substantially in accord with the common-law rule applicable
to public utilities in general. See note 5 supra. See also Farmers Livestock Comm'n Co.
v. United States, 54 F.2d 375 (E.D. Ill. 1931) (individual refusal to buy from or sell to
a customer, as well as concerted boycott, a discriminatory practice within prohibition of
the Packers and Stockyards Act). Nevertheless, this similarity to conversion-exempt
public utilities need not protect commission merchants. See note 5 supra.
17. See 244 F.2d at 631, citing Birmingham v. Rice Bros., 238 Iowa 410, 417-18, 26
N.W.2d 39, 43, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947) : "Certainly, Congress did not adopt the
Packers and Stockyards Act to encourage and protect the operation of fences for handling
property stolen or procured by fraud .... It is not wrongful discrimination to refuse to
aid a criminal in his crime, nor is a request that one dispose of property fraudulently
procured or stolen a reasonable request." See also De Vries v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 100
F. Supp. 781, 786 (D. M1inn. 1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 934 (1953) (§ 205 of the Packers and Stockyards Act held not to require market
agency to furnish services under any and all circumstances to any and all customers).
1958]
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Nevertheless, the common-law immunity of carriers might have been ex-
tended to auctioneers.' 8 Compelled to receive and forward all goods properly
prepared for shipment in the usual course of business,19 a carrier is not liable
to the true owner for innocently transporting goods at the direction of an
unauthorized apparent owner.20 This protection, derived from the carrier's
status as bailee, 21 has been rationalized on grounds of commercial expediency.
Although the carrier could investigate title before accepting goods from a pro-
spective bailor,2 2 such inquiry is impractical. As a public intermediary dealing
with transient chattels, the common carrier faces disproportionate delays in
searching title.23 Limited liability renders inquiry and attendant disruption of
commerce unnecessary. An auctioneer, while transferring title to goods, con-
fronts similar delays if he seeks protection through investigation of owner-
ship.24 And he is subject to comparable public utility restrictions.2 5 To the
18. Nanson v. Jacob, 93 Mo. 331, 6 S.W. 246 (1887). See Blackwell v. Laird, 236
Mo. App. 1217, 163 S.W.2d 91 (1942) (strongly implying the analogy between carriers
and commission agents). See note 5 supra. Notes, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 534 (1955), 32
M NN. L. REV. 86, 89 (1947).
19. See Swayne & Hoyt v. Everett, 255 Fed. 71 (9th Cir. 1919) ; ELLIorr, BAIMENrS
AND CARRIERS §§ 130, 139 (2d ed. 1929) ; 1 MICHm, CARRIERS § 333 (1915).
20. Shellnut v. Central of Ga. Ry., 131 Ga. 404, 62 S.E. 294 (1908) ; Nanson v. Jacob,
93 Mo. 331, 6 S.W. 246 (1887) ; Switzler v. Northern Pac. Ry., 45 Wash. 221, 88 Pac.
137 (1907); 1 HARPEvR & JAMES, ToI s § 2.20 (1956); 2 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 349,
comment d (1933). A carrier's immunity from conversion liability is atypical. At common
law, a carrier is an insurer against loss or damage to goods received for carriage. Other
exceptions arise only from acts of God or public enemies, the negligence of the shipper or
the inherent nature of the property. 2 WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORAInoNS §§ 984-91
(1911) ; Note, Limitations on Liability for Negligence in Documents of Title, 32 NEE. L.
REv. 600, 601-02 (1953) ; 8 AL. L. REv. 423, 424 (1955). Thus, the immunity is limited:
a carrier who misdelivers goods is ordinarily liable in conversion to the shipper or person
entitled to their possession unless misconduct (on their part) induced the error. See Esther-
ville Produce Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 57 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1932); Maryland
Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. 180, 107 A.2d 73 (1954).
21. In Birmingham v. Rice Bros., 238 Iowa 410, 420, 26 N.W.2d 39, 44, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 768 (1947), the carrier's protection was distinguished on the ground that "the
carrier in transporting does not undertake to deal with or affect in any manner the rights
or title of the owners or chattel mortgagees in the shipments." This analysis was criticized
in 32 MINN. L. REv. 86, 89 (1947).
22. A common carrier has the right to protect itself against fraud or imposition through
reasonable and necessary rules for the transaction of its business. Cf. Henderson Coal Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 73 Pa. Super. 45, 51 (1919) (dictum); Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 289 U.S. 627 (1933). Inspection of a shipper's title, apparently not involv-
ing unjust discrimination, would seem to be within this general rule.
23. See Note, 33 TEXAS L. REv. 534 (1955), which justifies exemption of the carrier
on commerce-disruption grounds and analogizes the carrier and livestock commission agent.
24. See Citizens State Bank v. Farmers Union Livestock Cooperative Co., 165 Kan.
96, 113-14, 193 P.2d 636, 647-48 (1948) (dissent) : "[M]arketing operations at the great
livestock markets are of necessity . . . integrated and fast-moving transactions .... The
required acceptance of consignments of livestock often crowding the market and demand-
ing expeditious handling, permits no substantial delay if the service of bringing buyer and
seller together is to be well performed. What sort of inquiries must it make in order to
escape liability to some unknown mortgagee? How wide a territory must it include in the
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e-:tent commercial considerations govern, denying him insulation allowed the
carrier seems inconsistent. Moreover, investigation by the auctioneer would
impede the aim of the Packers and Stockyards Act-an unhampered flow of
livestock from range to stockyard.26
But strict liability does not in fact induce the auctioneer to investigate and
hence does not cause commerce-disrupting delays. An auctioneer cannot afford
delays and will, in the first instance, assume the risk of loss. 2 7 He may, of
course, attempt to minimize this loss through increased commission fees with-
in the rate structure fixed by the Secretary of Agriculture, and through in-
surance.2 8 Still, complete ability to shift risks is unlikely.2 9 The decisive ques-
scope of its delaying inquiries? ... [T]he burden here imposed upon the interstate opera-
tions of the regulated markets is a grave one, tending to delay and impede the service they
are instituted to perform."
25. See note 16 supra. The Supreme Court, in Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495
(1922), characterized stockyards as businesses affected with a public use, of a national
nature and subject to national regulation. See also Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 STAT.
159 (1921), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1952).
26. See Stafford v. Wallace, supra note 25; Birmingham v. Rice Bros., 238 Iowa 410,
424, 26 N.W.2d 39, 46, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768 (1947) (dissent) ; H.R. REP. No. 77,
67th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 14 (1921.) ; 47 COLUm. L. REv. 861, 862 (1947).
27. A typical risk, borne by the transfer agent or bank, occurs when a legitimate order
instrument is stolen, and payment is made on the forged endorsement. Cf. Union Bank &
Trust Co. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 8 Cal. 2d 303, 65 P.2d 355 (1937). Yet banks tend
to prefer faster service and increased risk as opposed to delays caused by preventive
techniques. See 14 U. CH. L. Rav. 705, 708 (1947). See also Corker, Risk of Loss From
Forged Instruments, 4 STAN. L. Rav. 24, 30-31 (1951) ; Kessler, Forged I.ndorsemnents, 47
YALE L.J. 863, 896 (1938). If an auctioneer wishes to facilitate market operations, his
need for fast service is no less urgent. See 33 TEXAS L. Rwv. 534 (1955).
28. The Secretary of Agriculture has power to review rates submitted by stockyards
covered by the act. 42 STAT. 164 (1921), 7 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1952). Commission fees
are determined with reference to a variety of factors, among which risk may be explicitly
included. American Comm'n Co. v. United States, 11 F. Supp. 965, 970 (D. Colo. 1935).
See note 36 infra.
Insurance for the auctioneer would appear no different in operation from insurance
carried by brokers and banks against forgery losses. Such forgery insurance is not un-
common. See Notes, 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 705, 709 (1947), 7 U. CHi. L. REv. 497, 510
(1940). A market agency can also protect itself by requiring consignors of livestock to
furnish a bond or insurance against loss. De Vries v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 100 F. Supp..
781, 787 (D. Minn. 1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 934
(1953).
Conceivably, an auctioneer could demand a bond in every transaction, thereby avoiding
the burden of title losses. But a bonding system is open to criticism, particularly when
the true owner is a mortgagee. First, the mortgagee is better able to prevent losses than
the professional bondsman, initially by lending money carefully and then by policing poten-
tially fraudulent mortgagors. Cf. Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security: I, 57 YALE L.J.
517, 538 (1948). Second, if the bondsman conducts a title investigation, he faces the same
delays as the auctioneer. Finally, compared to a mortgagee, a bondsman is not a signifi-
cantly superior distributor of risks. A mortgagee shifts losses to mortgagors in the form
of higher interest rates while a bondsman shifts losses to consignors through higher bond-
ing charges. Thus, both are professional, compensated risk bearers. See note 44 infra and
accompanying text.
29. Rate increases must meet with the Secretary of Agriculture's approval. See note
19581
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tion, then, is which of two innocent parties shall bear the loss created by the
consignor: the auctioneer or the true owner.3 0 Ideally, the solution should
depend on the comparative ability of each to spread risk and prevent loss.3'
When unmortgaged goods are stolen or obtained by fraud, auctioneer and
rightful owner are equally capable of preventing loss, but the auctioneer is
better able to spread risk. Placing liability on the owner prevents loss by im-
28 supra. And administrative regulation may make it difficult for an agent to spread the
risk of loss through increased fees. 47 CoLuvX. L. Rav. 861, 862-63 (1947). See also
Sellers, Procedures of Regulatory Agencies in the United States Department of Agricul-
ture, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 352, 370 (1940). Determined as a percentage of capital investment,
fees have approximated seven per cent. Denver Union Stock Yard Co. v. United States,
21 F. Supp. 83, 91, (D. Colo. 1937), aff'd, 304 U.S. 470, 485 (1938). Even increased rates
will not shift the entire cost of risk, since under competitive conditions a market agency's
business volume may decline as charges rise. See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1107, 1119 n.62
(1957).
30. This dichotomy assumes that the consignor is either insolvent or unavailable and
that the purchaser from the auctioneer is also unavailable or protected by a factors' act.
See note 9 supra. Theoretically, since the true owner has full title to the chattel, he can
proceed at his option against either the misappropriating consignor, the innocent auctioneer
or the purchaser from the auctioneer. Comment, Conversion by Innocent Agents, 28 YALE
L.J. 175, 177 (1918) ; note 9 supra. Usually, however, the problem becomes one of placing
the burden of loss on the true owner or the auctioneer, both of whom are likely to be free
from fault. See note 31 infra.
31. On ability to spread risk, see, generally, James, Accident Liability Reconsidered:
The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948) ; Morris, Hazardous Enter-
prises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952) ; Douglas, Vicarious Liability
and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929) ; Comment, Allocation of Losses
From Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Comn-
mnercial Code, 62 YAL" L.J. 417, 433 (1953); Note, Forged Government Checks: Mis-
allocation of Loss by the Federal Comwon Law, 66 YALE L.J. 1107 (1957). See also
WILLE'r, THE EcoNomIc TH RaY OF RISK AND INSURANCE 101-02 (1951): "There are
two ways in which society may reduce the cost of uncertainty. It may adopt means to pre-
vent the occurrence of ... loss, or measures which will reduce the degree of uncertainty
... without affecting the amount of positive loss. All measures of the former kind may be
grouped under the name of prevention. . . . The general method of reducing uncertainty
. . . is through transfer of risk."
The negligence concept is the primary judicial device for allocation of liability where
the parties are in a position to prevent potential loss. True, a judicial standard based on
negligence comprises only one factor inducing careful conduct. See James, supra at 557-58.
Nevertheless, the negligence approach as a means of achieving loss prevention is not un-
realistic. Comment, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 438 (1953). For applications of this notion, see
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 38 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Ohio 1939), aff'd
per curiam, 119 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1941) (where third person's fraud results in loss, party
who first reposed confidence and committed the first oversight must bear loss) ; Keck v.
Browne, 314 Ky. 151, 234 S.W.2d 183 (1950) (as between cashing bank and drawer,
drawer bears loss where his own conduct invited the forgery).
If neither party is able to prevent loss, however, it should be allocated to the better
risk distributor. Conversely, risk-spreading facilities being equal, prevention or "moral"




pelling him to act prudently 2 Similarly, auctioneer liability, which in practice
fails to avert loss by forcing careful examination of title, precludes use of im-
munity as a shield for sales of goods known to be illegally procured.33 The
auctioneer, however, is generally better able than the owner to distribute the
cost of losses from theft and fraud as business expenses. 34 If legislative regula-
tion and difficulty of obtaining insurance make the auctioneer less than a perfect
risk spreader, the true owner's normally noninstitutional character renders him
an even less likely insurer and risk distributor.3: Moreover, under the Packers
and Stockyards Act, the government can make risk a cost item in rate sched-
ules.36 If this cost consists merely of premiums paid an insurance company for
32. Hence, a cattle owner, knowing that he must bear the burden of potential loss in
case of theft or fraud, will presumably deal with strangers more carefully and, at the same
time, take every precaution against theft. This reasoning, though attractive, is somewhat
deceptive. For fear of legal liability is not the sole inducement to careful conduct but
merely one of a constellation of motivations. See James, supra note 31, at 557-59.
33. An early argument against granting immunity to innocent auctioneers or market
agencies was that to do so would foster the sale of stolen goods. Hence, in Hoffman v.
Carow, 22 Wend. 285, 319-20 (N.Y. 1839), Senator Verplanck urged: "I cannot conceive
a more salutary regulation than that of obliging the auctioneer to look well to the title
of the goods which he sells, and in case of feloniously obtained property, to hold him
responsible to the buyer or the true owner, as the one or the other may happen to suffer.
Were our law otherwise in this respect, it would afford a facility for the sale of stolen or
feloniously obtained goods, which could be remedied in no way so effectually as by a
statute regulating sales at auction."
34. The institutional enterprise can calculate the incidence of loss and offset it through
higher rates or through insurance. Otherwise, the loss falls sporadically and unaccount-
ably on individuals, who often have no means of protection against it. See Corker, supra
note 27, at 31: "If banks assume the risk of loss by forgery, the cost will ultimately be
passed on to all their depositors. If depositors bear the risks, losses will fall at random
with the impact of unpredictable disaster." As an institutionalized if nonnegligent agent,
therefore, the auctioneer is in a better position both to predict and distribute loss than the
individual true owner. See Kessler, supra note 27, at 896-97; Comment, 43 ILL. L. REv.
823, 831 (1949) ; Note, 37 MINN. L. REv. 201, 204 (1953). See also Note, 8 U. CHI. L.
REv. 729, 743-45 (1941).
35. For cases in which the rightful owner is noninstitutional, see, e.g., John Clay &
Co. Livestock Comm'n v. Clements, 214 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1954) (individual cattle dealer
defrauded) ; Blackwell v. Laird, 236 Mo. App. 1217, 163 S.W.2d 91 (1942) (cattle stolen
from individual owner); Walker v. Caviness, 256 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953)
(same); Cresswell v. Leftridge, 194 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946) (individual cattle
owner defrauded) ; Moderie v. Schmidt, 6 Wash. 2d 592, 108 P.2d 331 (1940) (same).
See Morris, supra note 31, at 1177, which contrasts the institutional enterpriser with cal-
culable risks and the noninstitutional injured party by whom certain classes of risk are
unforeseeable. The enterpriser, by this analysis, is a better distributor of risk.
36. 42 STAT. 166 (1921), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 211. (1952), provides that the Secre-
tary of Agriculture "may determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable
rate or charge . . . and what regulation or practice is or will be just, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory." In determining reasonable rates, the Secretary can use as a basis:
property value including land, labor, construction overhead, interest on used and useful
land and working capital. Denver Stock Yard Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 470, 478
(1937). But rates can also be gauged to include agency selling costs. Among such costs
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indemnity against loss, computation and inclusion of cost are simple matters.
When insurance is unavailable, computation becomes more difficult. Still, the
cost of losses could be determined on a long-term empirical basis and be given
ultimate recognition under the act.3 7 Alternatively, the government could make
insurance available, thus facilitating both computation of cost and risk spread-
ing.3
8
When loss is caused by a fraudulent mortgagor as in Matthews, recordation
requirements do not increase the auctioneer's capacity for loss prevention, and
cost is better distributed by the mortgagee. In theory, recordation avails the
auctioneer of a sufficient opportunity to prevent passage of defective titles.39
And, if he does business in the state or county of recordation, recourse to
mortgage files may in fact yield notice. More often, however, title search is
commercially unfeasible and will not reveal liens on rapidly moving chattels. 4°
These shortcomings are most evident when the auctioneer conducts his busi-
is risk. Hence, in American Comm'n Co. v. United States, 1.1 F. Supp. 965, 969-70 (D.
Colo. 1935), the court said that charges should be "no more than the reasonable cost of
selling a carload of cattle. This to be arrived at by taking the cost of performing the
necessary services .... This he did by finding the aggregate cost of handling the cattle
.... ,the number of men reasonably necessary to perform the services, the amount of
salaries necessary to pay them, making reasonable allowance for all other proper costs,
including management risk ... ." Later in the opinion, the court added that risk compen-
sation, having been allowed in the category of risk expense and profit, should not have
been included as a selling cost. Id. at 970. But ef. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409
(1940) (Secretary of Agriculture's function in determining rates for services rendered
not merely to examine expenditures and actual income but to inquire whether services are
properly chargeable to the public).
37. Retrospective empirical data have been authorized in rate-making generally. In
gathering evidence concerning rates, the Secretary has been held entitled to examine con-
ditions over such a period of past operations as would enable him to make a fair prediction
in fixing maximum rates. See St. Josephs Stock Yards v. United States, 293 U.S. 38,
46-47 (1936).
38. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for instance, is an adjunct to a federal
banking and currency system. See Hust, Federal Deposit Insurance and Sonie of Its Con-
stitutional Aspects, 7 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 595, 628-29 (1939). Similarly, government in-
surance held by market agencies subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act could be
considered supplemental to that legislation.
39. See Mason City Production Credit Ass'n v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 205 Minn. 537,
286 N.W. 713, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 599 (1939) (livestock chattel mortgage filed in Iowa
constructive notice under Iowa law to Minnesota market agency registered under the
Packers and Stockyards Act). But constructive notice of a recorded chattel mortgage may
be specifically inapplicable to an agent not asserting a property interest in the goods. Greer
v. Newland, 70 Kan. 315, 78 Pac. 835 (1904) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Siman, 65 S.D. 514, 275
N.W. 347 (1937) (dictum). If classed as a subsequent purchaser, however, the auctioneer
must search the public records to protect himself. See Comment, 35 TEXAS L. REv. 246,
248 (1956).
40. See Note, Effect of Sale by Mortgagor of Chattels Subject to Mortgage, 46 YALr
L.J. 1090, 1092-93 (1937) ; Legis., The Uniform Chattel Mortgage .let, 19 VA. L. REV.
635 (1933) ; Myerson, Practical Aspects of Some Legal Problems of Sales Finance Com-
panies, 2 LAw & CoNTEmp. PaoB. 244, 250-51 (1935).
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ness outside the jurisdiction of recordation. Foreign recording is regularly
recognized when the chattel is removed without notice to the mortgagee. 41 Such
extraterritorial operation heightens the auctioneer's difficulties in obtaining
actual notice. Accordingly, he has no greater ability to prevent losses occasioned
by fraudulent mortgagors than those attributable to theft or fraud in the absence
of a mortgage.42 The mortgagee, on the other hand, is better able to distribute
41. See Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 Pac. 190 (1928) ; Gen-
eral Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 195 La. 210, 196 So. 323 (1940); 2 BEALE, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS §§ 268.1, 275.1 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CoNFLICr OF LAWS § 268(1) (1934) ;
29 NED. L. Rzv. 124 (1949). But see id. at 126; Farmer v. Evans, 111 Tex. 283, 233 S.W.
101 (1921) (minority view).
42. A system of mortgage registration might be devised, however, which would allow
auctioneers to check title and thus justify imposition of liability on loss-prevention grounds.
Conceivably, such a system might be developed in the form of a federal clearinghouse, not
dissimilar to motor vehicle registries. Perhaps most troublesome of all transient chattels,
automobiles have called forth various antitheft devices to protect both moneylender and
ultimate purchaser. The certificate of title, for instance, has often been linked with central
filing of liens by a commissioner of motor vehicles. Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law
and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 455, 460 n.12 (1948) (collecting state
statutes with central filing provisions). Both the methods and objectives of central filing
for automobile liens are adaptable to livestock chattel mortgage situations, with the added
advantage that no problem of reregistration in another state through a forged bill of sale
would be presented. For a discussion of the reregistration problem, see id. at 460.
Nevertheless, a difficulty does arise concerning the scope of effect that central filing
should have. If central filing is a substitute for ordinary recordation only upon removal
of the chattel to another state, it would appear to be clearly within the commerce power.
Central registration pre-empting regular notice on intrastate chattels, however, might be
considered a federal encroachment on state powers. Militating against such an interpreta-
tion of potential clearinghouse legislation is the specifically interstate character of stock-
yards and market agencies. See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922). Ideally, a
mortgagee wishing to protect his security interest in livestock would be obligated to record
at a regional filing bureau whether or not the livestock was intended for interstate com-
merce. A prudent mortgagee would record centrally in any event, to guard against the
possibility of loss through fraudulent removal to another state. Should the clearinghouse
employ modern automated techniques in filing and reporting liens, inquiry by telephone or
telegraph, which should not slow commercial transactions appreciably, might be possible.
See Van Deusen, The Coming Victory Over Paper, Fortune, Oct. 1955, pp. 130, 132:
"What the banking profession has needed is a machine that will rapidly handle paper
checks of varied size and at the same time automatically extract enough information from
each check so that data may be manipulated ... without further reference to the check it-
self. This, essentially, is what Bank of America's machine does, using magnetic markings
on the back of the check as a source of information. And the Bank of America machine
is a forerunner of a whole series of similar new devices and systems . . . " Proper appli-
cation of such methods to a mortgage clearinghouse might make time a negligible factor
in conducting title searches.
The cost of such a system would, of course, fall on the mortgagee, the best available
risk distributor. See notes 43, 44 infra and accompanying text. A similar marginal cost
problem is encountered by banks in regard to stop-payment orders on checks, the cost of
which includes both the value of resources expended in the mechanics of stopping checks
and the actuarial cost of payment without recourse. A tendency toward equilibrium is in-
herent in the stop-payment operation if the bank bears the burden of erroneous payment.
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loss than the rightful owner of unmortgaged goods or the auctioneer. 43 Gen-
erally at least as institutionalized as the auctioneer, the mortgagee is in the
business of lending money at a rate of interest reflecting estimated risk of
loss. 44 He is, therefore, an almost ideal risk spreader. Especially is this true
in cases arising under federal law, which normally applies only when the gov-
ernment, the optimum risk-spreading organization, is mortgagee.45
When fraud or theft colors a sale of livestock, courts should gear liability to
the relative capacity of the parties for risk distribution. Absent notice, the
auctioneer is as innocent as the mortgagee or rightful owner.46 Each has com-
parable ability to prevent loss. 47 They differ, however, in capacity to distribute
risk. So viewed, liability should rest on the auctioneer in cases involving un-
mortgaged goods and on the mortgagee when the livestock has been mort-
gaged.48 To reach this result, courts will have to interpret recording statutes
to give constructive notice only to subsequent purchasers, encumbrancers and
mortgagees, and not to auctioneers without a property interest in the chattels. 1'
It -will then incur costs in the attempt to stop payment up to the point where marginal
costs are equal in amount to the attributable reduction of risk. Comment, Stop Payment:
An Ailing Service to the Business Community, 20 U. C. L. REv. 667, 669 (1953) ; cf.
Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1.107, 1117 n.52 (1957). This marginal cost analysis is equally appli-
cable to livestock mortgagees who would pay for the privilege of central recording. In
fact, strict application of the analysis would require mortgagees to bear telegraph and
telephone charges incurred in checking title.
43. See Note, 46 YALE L.J. 1090, 1093 (1937). See also Gilmore & Axelrod, supra
note 28, at 517 n.1: "The focus of security law is not, and ought not to be on the protection
of the lender against the borrower's 'fraud'; the 'fraud' situation itself is likely to be an
aspect of debtor behavior on threatening insolvency, or else is too infrequent to be worth
bothering about outside the criminal law."
44. See MuRRAY, AGRICULTURAL FiNANCE 112 (1946): "Risk is another factor that
affects the interest rate. Lenders, as a rule, compete actively for large loans in low risk
territory. High risk areas . . . are avoided by the lending agencies who are looking for
relatively safe loans. These agencies are willing to lend on farm mortgages at 4% in the
Corn Belt rather than . . . at 6% in the drouth [sic] sections of the Great Plains." The
local moneylender may be an especially good bearer of risk for other reasons. He usually
has a thorough knowledge of his customers that is distinctly helpful in short-term lending,
and his interest rates are often fixed and noncompetitive, yielding a higher than normal
profit. See id. at 169, 172 (local commercial banks).
45. See Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1107, 1118 (1957), which emphasizes the unique pusition
of the government as risk distributor.
According to the Clearfield doctrine, federal law applies whenever the government sues
on paper it has issued. See note 13 supra. Thus, government mortgage paper requires the
use of federal law. If the government sues after goods have been stolen from it or other-
wise fraudulently obtained, however, government paper would probably not be the basis
of the suit, and Clearfield would not control.
46. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 32, 33 supra and accompanying text. The mortgagee's capacity to select
borrowers carefully may be considered to put him in a good position to prevent loss. See
note 44 supra. Such an argument, however, seems better suited to rationalize than to
create his liability. See text at note 50 infra.
48. See text at notes 34, 35, 44, 45 supra.
49. See note 39 supra.
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Within this framework, technical grounds can be employed to shift liability
between the mortgagee and the auctioneer. When the livestock is unmort-
gaged, the auctioneer can be deemed a converter as he is under existing law.
When a mortgage is involved, the auctioneer's liability as a converter can be
considered overcome by the mortgagee's act of putting the mortgagor in a
position to create the loss.5' Once choosing to deal with the mortgagor, the
mortgagee must undertake the attendant credit risks.r' Utilization of these
technical grounds will enable courts to recognize commercial reality in deter-
mining liability for business conversion.
50. Some courts have held that the mortgagee initiates the causal chain culminating
in the loss by clothing the fraudulent mortgagor with apparent ownership. See Consolidated
Garage Co. v. Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921) (overruled by Bank of
Atlanta v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843 (1950)) ; 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 713, 717-18
(1947). This reasoning is merely a specific application of the general equitable principle
that where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be borne by the one
who has rendered the loss possible. National Safe Deposit Co. v. Hibbs, 2Z9 U.S. 391
(1913) (when bank as assignee of blank stock certificates entrusts them to clerk who
sells them to innocent stockbroker, bank must answer for the loss) ; Schrader v. Westport
Ave. Bank, 236 Mo. App. 362, 156 S.W.2d 753 (1941) (when stockbroker fraudulently
pledges securities belonging to customer, pledgee can retain securities until repaid amount
due him).
51. See note 50 supra. See also Report of the Commissioners on a Uniform Chattel
Mortgage Act, in HANDOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMlISSlONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAws 417 (1926): "[T]he draft proceeds on the basis that the mortgagor's
honesty is a credit risk which is undertaken by the mortgagee."
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